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ÄBSTRACT 
The historical development of steam boiler technology aboard 
steam- and later motor-ships is reviewed, setting the stage for 
statistical investigations of langer term trends in the frequency 
of boiler explosions. 
Two different measures of the safety performance have to be 
addressed in such an analysis: 
The explosion rate per ship- or boiler-year in an entire 
fleet, and 
the failure ratio, i.e. the probability that a boiler of a 
certain vintage suffers an explosion during his useful life. 
The major obstacle for both analyses, the distortions due to 
statistical fluctuations, have been dealt with by applying a spe-
cial smoothing procedure. The failure ratio analysis requires 
further an estimation of failures to be statistically expected in 
the future; this is accomplished by means of a previously developed 
methodology. This paper is primarily concerned with the statistical 
analysis of boiler exolosion data. The methodology is published 
elsewhere. 
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I. lNTRODUCTION 
The technology of steam raising aboard ship is an example of an 
area with a lang historical basis and a wide statistical span. Despite 
the advent of the motorship steam ships are still in widespread common 
use today and continue to be built in large numbers. 
The fact that seafnring has always been a risky business and re-
cognised as such led at a very early stage to the development of the 
classification societies, notably Lloyd's and Det Norske Veritas. The 
records of these institutions provide a very comprehensive data base 
for the number of ships at sea over the years as well as for accident 
occurrence within some categories. In the development of the marine boiler 
there is no doubt that the watchful eye of the insurers has had a benign 
influence tending to ensure a relatively rapid evolution of safety in this 
case. This improving safety is reflected in reduced chances for boiler 
explosions. 
Data on major failures, such as boiler explosions, are often plagued 
by considerable statistical fluctuations which hamper the determination 
of a clear trend. Recently refined data analysis methods have been de-
veloped that address two trends of interest in the context of an evolution 
of safety: 
trend of the failure rate per operation year as function of time (t) 
(Refs. 1, 2, and 3); 
trend of the chance of a failure per unit as function of the construc-
tion year (tc), the so called "failure ratio." This latter trend 
analysis includes the evaluation of the age (c) dependency of the 
occurrence of failures (Ref. 4). 
The subject of this paper is the application of these methods to 
boiler explosions aboard steam ships. Two sets of data have been analysed: 
The first set of data is for British steam ships, for which boiler 
explosions had to be registered according to the "Boiler Explosions ActS 11 
of 1882 and 1890. Summaries of the detailed information are availanle 
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in Ref. 6. The information on the British steam ship population as needed 
for this analysiswas made available for this study by Lloyd's Register 
of Shipping (Ref. 7). 
The second set of data covers an international ship population, 
as listed in Lloyd's Register, with boiler explosions from 1960 through 
1981 (Ref. 8). The corresponding population size is given in the same 
reference. 
A preliminary discussion analysis of these data is presented in 
Ref. 9. 
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ll TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
SurveY of Hfsto~i~al Development 
The main problern which faced all early steam engineers was the 
design and construction of a closed vessel capable of producing steam 
at a constant, relatively low, pressure of between 0.2 and 0.35 bar. The 
materials available in the early days were: copper, cast iron and wrought 
iron, but the difficulty of obtaining boiler plates of the required thick-
ness and size as well as that of finding personnel skilled in handling 
the relatively thick plates severely limited the rate of development 
at first. Boiler design evolved through trial and error. Even as late as 
the late nineteenth century there were no theoretically formulated rules 
available to give the pressure vessel designer a sound basis (Ref. 10). 
The results of the wholly empirical approach coupled with an exponential 
increase in the number of boilers constructed and a gradual increase in 
the normal steam working pressures was that over one period the number of 
boiler explosions increased both in rate and severity. 
Whilst land based steam engines have been recorded since 1763 (and 
other devices powered by steam since the late 17th century) even, another 
39 years were to pass before the technology was considered sufficiently 
proven to be incorporated into a ship. 
The first steam ship, powered by a beam engine, was commissioned in 1802. 
This opened the door to widespread exploitation of the technology and 
to continual improvements. In 1853, high pressure steam was first intro-
duced into marine applications,and in 1897 a further change in the type 
of power plant available emerged with the advent of the marine steam 
turbine. Araund the same time various mechanical stoking systems started 
to be introduced, though manual stoking was never completely eliminated 
from solid fuel fired marine boilers. Towards the end of the 1930's a slow 
change over from coal to oil firing of boiler started, which was not 
to finish completely until the early 1950's. This latter change intro-
duced a whole new category of accident types, discussed in a later section. 
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Table 1 illustrates the evolution of on-board steam generators in 
terms of their characteristic technical data for a number of represen-
tative steam ships built between 1858 and 1975. The steam pressure in-
creased from 1.7 to 100 bar, the temperature from 130 to 520 °C and 
accordingly, the thermal efficiency from 4.8 to 33.6 %. 
It would be unrealistic to consider the development of the marine boiler 
as if it took place in complete isolation, naturally land based develop-
ments had their influence upon marine engineering and vice versa. That 
said, whilst land based plant can still be a proving ground for marine 
application and whilst they originated from the same stem, the special 
requirements of the marine environment rapidly lead to a major divergence 
in design characteristics. There are of course several reasons for this, 
but in the main they all stem from thecfact that when all is said and 
done a ship must fluat and navigate. It might be said that the marine 
environment imposed more stringent requirements - indeed it appears on 
the whole to have lead to more sophisticated and more efficient power 
plant. A comparison between the size of marine and land based boilers 
of identical power, (Fiq. 1, from Ref. 12) illustrates this point quite 
well. 
In the marine environment the following factors play a role, roughly in 
this order of importance: 
small size-to-power ratio 
small weight-to-power ratio 
rapid steam raising/cooling 
swift power Changeability 
reliability 
easy-ta-handle fuel 
universally available fuel 
In the land based boiler, size and weight are relatively unimportant, 
constant non-fluctuating working is generally more important than the 
ability to make rapid changes, and cheap locally available fuels can 
often be arranged to be used. Reliability is however often of paramount 
importance. 
Table 1 
(after ref. /11/) 
ILLUSTRATING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN STEAM SHIPS 
BY REFERENCE TOSTEAM PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND THERMAL EFFICIENCY 
Date Ship Machinery Type Steam Pressure Stern Temperature Thermal Efficiency 
bar oc % 
1858 Great Eastern Reciprocating 1.7 130 4.8 
1902 Kaiser Wilhelm II Reciprocating 15.5 203 12.7 
1907 Mauretania Turbine 13.5 197 12.4 U1 
1910 Olympic, Titanic Turbine/recip. 14.8 201 12.7 
1929 Bremen, Europa Turbine 22.5 360 18.7 
1942 Examiner Reheat turbine 83 400 26.3 
1956 Caltex Rotterdam Turbine 41 510 27.1 
1967 Idemitsu Maru Reheat turbine 83 510 31.6 
1968 Esso Mercia Turbine 59 510 30.8 
1970 Golar Nichu Reheat turbine 102 525 33.8 
1975 Golar Patricia Reheat tu.rbi ne 100 520 33.6 
Fig. 1: 
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left: an oil-fired marine boiler; 
right: a pulverized-fuel land boiler of identical output 
(240,000 pound/hour) (after Ref. 12) 
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Naturally safety is important in both environments. Onshore, a 
measure of increased safety can be obtained by the old engineering adage 
of overdesign of the component parts. In the marine context this must how-
ever be regarded as an intolerable luxury - no unnecessary weight or volume 
can be tolerated. A very similar line of considerations has lead to similarly 
divergent design criteria for ship tankers of oil and liquefied gases 
compared to land-based storage systems. 
To 11 COmpensate11 for the inability to overdesign, safety margins at 
sea have been improved by the development of more sophisticated control 
systems. Thus whilst current boiler management systems are rapidly approach-
ing the electronic era, as recently as 1977 it was observed that the most 
frequent cause of land based boiler explosions was over-heating through 
shortage of water - despite the fact that the majority of modern boilers 
are fitted with automatic water level and firing controls. A note by a 
U.K. factory inspector concluded that the incidence of darnage or explosions 
is actually higher for fully automatic systems than for manual systems -
for management rather than technological reasons! Other frequent causes 
of failure (Ref. 13) are: overpressure, corrosion, erosion and water-hammer. 
In the marine environment the frequent changes of working condition as well 
as the necessity for on-the-spot operatives leads to a much better record 
on this score. These same frequent changes also result in a reduction in 
the lifetime of the furnace refractory lining, which in turn means more 
frequent changes and simultaneously implies morefrequent internal inspec-
tions. Many potential causes for incidents thus tend to be nipped in the 
bud. 
When it comes to the question of boiler furnace explosions however 
the balance of safety is quite different. Here we may see the necessarily 
tightly designed marine boiler as particularly vulnerable. 
Boiler Furnace Explosions 
Up until the introduction of oil firing there had been many boiler 
explosions. The majority of these could be classified as 11 steam boxu ex-
plosions, where sudden failure occured through metallurgical fatigue/ 
failure in material properties, non-functioning safety or other valves. 
8 
In the case of the oil-fired boiler the firebox explosion starts to be the 
most serious risk. It also has a much greater darnage potential in its 
own right and, by causing secondary failure of containment of the pressure 
steam side as well can present a formidable incident. At the type of the 
fuel flow rates associated with normal boiler operation, sufficient fuel 
can be introduced to a hot furnace, following 11 flameout 11 to fill the latter 
with an explosive fuel/air mixture in a matter of seconds. Boiler furnaces 
though strong and built to withstand slight overpressures (Ref. 14) are 
weak indeed against the typical explosion pressures - so much so that 
to cause rupture only a small fraction of the fire box need be filled 
with an explosive mixture. To avoid this type of incident, which can only 
too easily occur, very careful control systems needed to be developed. 
These include fuel flow control, flame eyes, automatic purging sequencers, 
automatic igniters etc. etc. Though the state of technological art is 
such that even a few years ago an extremely reliable fuel management system 
could have been introduced, this is an area where extreme conservatism 
still tends to rule the day to some extent. To explain this in part, it 
is clear that most ships' captains regard the lass of motivepower as 
perhaps the most serious event they are likely to encounter. Who can blame 
them then for doing their own mental risk-benefit calculation and deciding 
that they would on balance sooner accept a slightly higher risk offirebox 
explosion than the risk of power lass following automatic shutdown on 
a false flame eye indication. Similar reasoning has lead to the relatively 
slow introduction of all-automatic ignition sequencers, though the risk 
of inadvertant or deliberate but misintentioned bypassing of sequencing 
procedures, leading to an increased chance that explosion conditions 
arise, is thus introduced. 
Referring to 11 0i1 firing 11 is an over simplification. In fact the 
type of fuel is quite critical to the running performance and also to the 
hazards posed in case of malfunction. Most merchant ships as well as naval 
vessels used heavy so called residual fuels to fire their boilers at least 
until the late 1950's. In the case of high firing rate boilers, typical 
of naval vessels, the fouling problern in many cases reached intolerable 
proportions, with damaged refractory linings, reduced heat transfer rates 
and superheater tube failures. In the British Royal Navy in a five year 
period in the early 60's no fewer than 12 ships had to undergo major surgery 
as a result of heavy fuel fouling problems. The solution to thi·s problern 
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for the Royal Navy was to go over to use of distillate fuel. In merchant 
ships the firing rates are often somewhat lower. Nevertheless there is also 
a tendency to use distillate fuel for easy start up and/or for auxiliary 
boilers. Whilst the hot surface autoignition temperature of both heavy 
fuel oil and distillate fuel are the same, the more volatile nature of 
the distillate fuel means in practice that it is far easier to arrive at 
the condition that an explosive fuel/air mixture builds up in a furnace 
after flame out. This means that precautions which are in any case important 
for any oil firing system are readily shown to be vital in the less for-
giving situation of distillate fired boilers. An alarming example of this 
point is the fact that following a conversion programme from residual to 
distillate fuel in the Royal Navy in the 60•s a rash of explosions occured 
- six in 1968 alone! 
Influence of Regulation Authorities 
From the very earliest times the classification societies, as the 
ships• insurers, have taken what amounts to a regulating line. In addition 
for U.S. registered ships, the U.S. coastguard has a regulating role. 
Generally this appears to have had the beneficial role of maintaining and 
continually upgrading standards. It might, however, be argued that to 
some extent the existence of norms, standards and codes can restriet 
the introduction of even safer procedures and technology. 
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111. ANALYSIS oF BoiLER ExPLOSIONs ABoARD BRITISH SHIPs, 
1882 THROUGH 1974 
Introductory Remarks 
The high frequency of 11 boiler11 explosions lead in Great Britian, 
the country with the largest number of boilers, to the 11 Boiler Explosions 
Act 1882 11 (revised 1890), being 11 an act to make better provisions for 
Inquiries with regard to Boiler Explosions ... Boiler expolosions and failures 
were then reported annually by the Board of Trade, Ref. 6. These reports 
contained detailed information an type, application, age and cause of failure, 
within a prespecified classification scheme, as well ; s ·detailed verbal 
and pictorial descriptions of the damage. 
The term 11 boiler 11 in the Explosion Act is quite general: it 11means 
any closed vessel used for generating steam, or for heating water, or for 
heating other liquids, or into which steam is admitted for heating, steaming 
boiling, or similar purposes ... This study, however, deals only with explo-
sions of the 11 Steam generating 11 system, an British ships, that are subject 
to the Explosion Act; excluded are 11 boilers used .... in the Government 
Service ... Main boilers, i.e. boilers for the ship•s propulsion, are con-
sidered separately. 
Although darnage description is available in great detail, reliable 
information an the annual construction rates, that is needed for a statistical 
analysis, is not available. It can be approximately inferred from changes 
in the number of registered ships. Another uncertainty results from the 
number of vessels per ship, that - on the average - is not constant, since 
technical progress allowed a strong increase in the vessel size. 
The number of British steam ships (that have the considered main 
boilers), and even more so the number of boilers in operation, decreased 
since the First World War as shown in Fig. 2. For the periods of both 
World Wars, the information an boiler explosions is incomplete. An inter-
polation of the failure data was applied to avoid a trend distertian 
resulting from that lack of data. 
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Fig. 2: Number of British steam ships, between 1890 and 1980 
(after Ref. 7) 
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Trends of Failure Rates 
For the analysis of the long-term trends of the failure rates, the 
boiler population is considered as a learning system. Failures provide 
information on possible system deficiencies, and lessons learned from 
failures should, on the average, lead to an improvement of the system 
in terms of a declining failure rate. As indicated above, the ship insurers 
have a benign influence in this direction. 
In Refs. 1 and 2, a simple model is developed that associates failure 
frequencies to the individual failure modes. Jhe overall failure rate is 
the sum of all individual frequencies. The learning that follows a specific 
failure event appears as a subsequent reduction of the respective frequency, 
possible even for an entire class of boilers. A refinement of the model in 
Ref. 3 also allows a search for a possible increase in failure rates as 
it might follow the rapid introduction of an insufficiently proven technical 
feature. Although several temporary increases in failure rates are historically 
indicated as discussed above, no attempt is made here to quantiatively 
analyze such short term trends. The emphasis is on the quantification of 
the langer term trend for which a learning process can be assumed through-
out. The failure data are at first expressed as temporal spacings between 
successive failure events in terms of operation years of the population 
(i.e. time interval times the average number of operating units). These 
spacing data are then subjected to a regression procedure where the 
overall improvement through learninq is expressed as a monotony constraint 
condition. If the failure-event spacings actually increase a monotonously 
declining failure rate is directly established. The ever present statistical 
fluctuations that appear as incidentally short failure-event spacings, are 
converted in this regression procedure in stretches of seemingly constant 
failure rate; the decrease in the failure rate is then "held up 11 over 
those periods. An actual decrease is not discernible during these times. 
The elimination of these fluctuations in a mat~ematically consistent 
manner is achieved by the 11 isotonic regression" procedure (Ref. 15) that 
identifies quantiatively the underlying monotonaus trend. The procedure 
is first applied to the spacings, yielding an increasing sequence. Its 
subsequent inversion then yields a monotonously declining failure rate. 
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Figure 3 shows the failure rate trend for the boiler explosions 
listed in Ref. 6, smoothed by the isotonic regression procedure, in terms 
of failures per ship-operation year {the ship population is from Ref. 7). 
Thus, Fig. 3 portrays the rate of explosive failures of the 11 Steam generat-
ing systems .. of this ship, which may consist of several boilers. 
Also depicted in Fig. 3 is the 90 % confidence band araund the 
isotonic regression values that indicates a high statistical significance 
of the identified trend. The 90 % confidence band is calculated for each 
individual frequency value that is obtained from the isotonic regression, 
without taking into account the order restriction of the isotonic regres-
sion procedure {comp. Ref. 3). Accounting for this order restriction would 
generally decrease the confidence band, especially the relatively large 
confidence band spread for the intervals with only one or a very few 
failures. 
The statistical siqnificance of a trend over a certain time period 
is derived from the notion that the confidence intervals at the beginning 
and at the end of that period should be well separated; if the confidence 
intervals would overlap strongly, a possibly indicated trend would not be 
significant. Apparently, the assessment of the significance of a trend 
depends on the definition of the confidence interval significance as well 
as on the degree of separation. If a 90 % interval is applied, the trend, 
i.e. a change in failure frequency, is assessed on the 90% level. 
Figure 3 indicates a significantly declininq trend for the compari-
son of the periods 1890 - 1900 and the subsequent one, 1900 - 1938, not 
however within these two periods. After 1938, there appear several periods 
with a significant trend: the eventual failure frequency is at least an 
order of magnitude below the values prevailing toward the end of the 
previous century. 
The good data base allows a statistical analysis of "components .. 
of the steam-generating system: 
Of the 1340 explosions in the period 1890 through 1974 that are 
analy4ed above, 845 occurred in main boilers and 162 in auxiliary boilers. 
Most of the remaining failures occurred through vibration induced rupture 
of the main steam pipe (187) and as explosion of a stop valve {58). The 
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remaining 88 cases are failures in various parts of the system and by 
various causes. 
The analysis of the explosions of main boilers reveals a significant-
ly declining frequency as shown in Fig. 4. The general trend is quite 
similar to the overall trend depicted in Fig. 3; however, the confidence 
band toward the end of the observation period becomes much larger to the 
extent that a trend significance on the 90 % level cannot be established 
after the Second Warld War. The failure rates are related to operation-times 
of steam ships; they therefore represent failures of the 11 propulsion steam 
generating system 11 of a steam ship. 
The reports of the Board of Trade differentiate further with respect 
to causes for the explosions: 
1. deterioration of corrosion 
2. defective design or undue working pressure 
3. water hammer action 
4. defective workmanship, material or construction 
5. i gnorance or negl ect of attendants 
6. miscellaneous 
As the most frequent causes within these categories are noted (the number 
of main boiler failures is given in parenthesis): 
to 1) 
to 2) 
to 3) 
to 4) 
to 5) 
internal corrosion, corrosion from leakage, gradual develop-
ment of a crack (460 cases); 
joint of manhole door improperly made, manhole door fitted 
badly, and undue working pressure (21 cases); 
the cause rarely noted (therefore it is not included in the 
analysis below) (1 case); 
(overlapping with 2) badly fitting manhole door, unsuitable 
jointing material (of manhole door joint), defective welding 
(131 cases); 
overheating through deposit of salt or scale, or through 
shortness of water due to neglect of attendants (195 cases). 
Of the 845 failures of main boilers, 37 cases are then in category 6. 
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Figure 5 depicts the failure trends in the four darnage categories 
1, 2, 4 and 5. {The analysis method is the same as above.) Thesetrends 
show some noticeable differences: 
The trend for the category 1 is similar to the overall trend since 
this category contains about 55 % of all failures. Category 2 shows a 
significant decrease already prior to the First World War, nearly down 
to the recent frequencies; i.e. design errors have been eliminated quite 
early. Less fortunate is the development of cause-category 4, for which 
the quality of the materials plays an important role. Practically no 
significant decrease is indicated for category 5; i.e. human error as 
cause of failures has not decreased since the beginning of the century. 
This also means that the design has not become more forgiving to operator 
errors. 
In addition to main boilers, darnage to the main steam pipes and 
stop valves are investigated, since they are part of the propulsion system 
and also have a high failure frequency. Figure 6 shows the two trends. 
Since ·steam pipe ruptures are mainly due to design errors and material 
problems, the failure frequency trend is between the category 2 and 4 
trends for the main boilers. The decrease over the observation period 
is highly significant; this does not appear to be the case for the stop 
valve failures. It should be noted, however, that between 1941 and the 
end of the observation period (1974), there is only one stop-valve failure 
so that the 90 % confidence interval is quite broad. 
The trends above are analyzed in terms of failures per ship or per 
propulsion system. Two alterations of the analysis come readily to mind, 
although additional information would be needed for it: 
One would be the relation of failures to the operation time of 
boilers instead of ships. With the number of boilers per ship decreasing in 
the long run, the resulting trends would be decreasing less than found 
above. This, however, would not be entirely fair, since the power output 
of the individual boilers has increased along with the reduction in their 
numbers. In this comparison, the trend would even be stronger declininq 
since the power of the steam ships has increased considerably. So, relating 
the failures to ship operation years, an approach that is suggested by 
the lack of other data, appears to be a good compromise. 
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Construction Year and Age Dependencies 
In Ref. 4 the "failure ratio", S(tc), was introduced as a measure 
of the safety performance of technical units built in the construction 
year tc. It is the probability for a unit to have a major failure during 
its useful life, or up to a designated maximum age. Here, the age of 
steam ships considered in this analysis is limited to 50 years. Unfortunate-
ly, the performance of boilers, for which the explosions have been analysed 
above, cannot be evaluated in these terms, since the information on their 
construction rate is not available. 
However, there is a combined quantity, for which the term "marginal 
failure potential", P(tc), was coined in Ref. 4, that can be extracted-
in a first approximation - directly from the available data. P(tc) is 
equal to thP. product of the failure ratio times the construction rate. 
Let P1(tc) denote the first approximation of P(tc), that evaluates the 
failures of technical units built in tc between tc and the end of the 
observation period, as opposed to P(tc), that pertains to the same designated 
period (here 50 years) for all tc. Thus P1(tc) is equal to or smaller than 
P(tc), the more so the shorter the observable age span. The deviation 
between P1 and P, however, is quite small for the main-boiler explosions 
analysed here (see below), and therefore P1 is used instead of P in the 
following. 
In the evaluation of a possible trend in P1(tc) the statistical fluc-
tuations need to be reduced by considering larger time intervals. There 
apparently is an optimum time-interval structure between the two extremes, 
i.e. between the minimum (annual) interval size, for which the trend is 
disguised by the large fluctuations of the small number of failures per 
interval on the one hand, and the maximum interval size, the entire obser-
vation period, for which the statistical fluctuations are smallest, but 
the trend information is totally lost. In the presented analysis, the 
interval structure was optimized by the criterion of finding the maximum 
number of intervals for which an overlap of the 90 % confidence -intervals 
(corresponding to 1.64 o) is just avoided, since a lack of that overlap 
establishes significance of the trend. In general, if a trend is identified 
by this method on a high le~el of significance, it can be assumed to exist 
in actuality; i.e. the demonstrated statistical significance is a sufficieht 
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criterion for the existence of a trend. However, it may not be a necessary 
criterion, i.e. a trend could well be present without demonstrated statistical 
significance, e.g. when the intervals are improperly chosen. 
Figure 7 presents P1(tc) for main boilers, calculated as described 
above. The interval optimization procedure yielded six tc-intervals for 
which the confidence intervals are comfortably separated, by 2.34 a, rather 
than the mini~um of 1.64 a. (For seven tc-intervals, the maximized minimal 
confidence band separation would have been smaller than 1.64 cr). 
As shown in Ref. 4, there is a convolution-integral type relation 
between P(tc) and the failure rate at time t. This relation is particularly 
simple for accidents due to design errors and faulty construction, since 
the corresponding failures have the tendency to occur early in the life 
of the affected units. Then, the failure rate 11 follows 11 the marginal failure 
potential with a characteristic time delay. In order to show this, the 
failure rate of main boilers, as obtained above, per operation year was 
approximately converted in a rate per calendar year by multiplication with 
the number of steam ships in operation (small circles in Fig. 7). 
Theinformative value of P1(tc) for these boilers is limited since 
it largely expresses the strong reduction of steam-ship construction 
over the recent few decades (see also Fig. 2). More informative is the age 
dependency, M1(T), of the failure events, where T denotes the age. M1(T) 
is defined as the sumofall actuarial explosions in ships of age T in 
the considered population. The index 11 111 again suggests an evaluation in 
a first approximation that here pertains to the consideration of the 
average ship-age dependency of the explosions for all construction years 
in the data base, M(T). It can be shown that in the discussed example M1(T) 
only slightly differs from M(T). Therefore M1 that can be directly ex-
tracted from the data is used instead of M in the following. 
Figure 8 shows this approximate age distribution, M1(T), of failures, 
for nine age-intervals. The 90 % confidence intervals do not overlap; 
so there is a significant trend of M1 with increasing age, T, on the 90 % 
confidence lvel. It appears that M1 shows atfirst a significant increase 
by about a factor of four, leading to a maximu~ araund an age of 10 years; 
this could be related to material problems, such as corrosion and fatigue 
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effects. Subsequently, M1(T) decreases by about two orders of magnitude, 
that may be partly due to the smaller nurober of units with larger age. 
The data base for the analysis of the age distribution of main-boiler 
explosions consists of 799 cases. (The difference to 845 cases noted earlier 
is due to the deletion of steam ships that are older than 50 years and/or 
are built before 1882). This rich data base provides the opportunity to 
search for a possible construction year dependency of M(T). For this, 
two construction year intervals are considered: 1882 - 1899 and 1900 - 1974. 
Both groups contain about the same number of explosions. Figure 9 presents 
both sets of M1-values, with solid lines for the first and dashed lines 
for the second. The same set of age intervals was used for better compar-
ability. Apparently, most of the 90 % confidence intervals about these 
two sets of M1-values overlap substantially, as indicated by the hatched 
areas. Therefore, the differencesbetween M1(T) in the last century from 
the corresponding values in this century are not statistically significant, 
at least not on the 90% level. Still, there appears tobe the tendency 
that for the more recent group , boiler explosions occur later in their 
life than for the earlier group, an effect that could be due to fewer 
design-error related failures and due to better materials. 
In Ref. 4, a method was developed that allows an evaluation of the 
failure ratio, P(tc), and of the age dependency, M(T), given P1(tc) and 
M1(,). They pertainto the same designated maximum age, say T5 • That requires 
a completion of the ac~uarial information contained in P1(tc) and M1(T), 
by failures to be statistically expected in units that have not reached 
the age T5 • If however, M1(T) and P1(tc) are strongly decreasing, as it is 
the case for the boiler explosion data analyzed here, and if the observa-
tion period is much larger than T5 , the completion procedure yields only 
a minimal addition; here about 4 explosions as compared to the 799 actual 
events. Then, P(tc) ~ P1(tc) and M(T) ~ M1(T) as was assumed above. 
The previous categorization with respect to causes of failures has · 
been extended to the investigation of the corresponding age distributions 
(see Fig. 10): the fatigue and corrosion related categories 1 and 4 ~how a 
max~mum araund age 10, that is also reflected in the overall Ml(T). The 
des1gn-error related category 2 appears to have its largest occurrence 
rate at the beginning, although the nurober of cases is too small to 
1 
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establish a high-level statistical significance. The category 5 events 
(human error) appear to have a maximum araund 6 to 7 years that could be 
due to a gradual build-up of system deficiencies resulting from inadequate 
maintenance, e.g. leading to deposits of salt or scale. The decrease 
after about 20 years of age is apparent in the four categories as well 
as in the total M1(•) to various degrees. This could in part be due to 
an elimination (through explosions) of units with design flaws, poor 
construction, or due to inadequate maintenance, leading to an increased 
level of safety in the remaining population. The main cause for the de-
crease in M1(•) should be that older units are decommissioned for various 
other reasons. Thus, M1(•) pertains to a strongly decreasing population 
at higher age. 
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IV. STEAM SHIPS FROM LLovo's REGISTER, 1960 - 1968 
Introductory Remarks 
The steam ship data analyzed in this section have been assembled by 
Lloyd's Register in a special contract study (Ref. 8). The statistical 
analysis is methodologically the same as above; however, there are a number 
of remarkable differences so that the results are not directly comparable: 
The failure data pertain to a different ship population, generally 
newer ships of international fleets. The ships in Lloyd's Register 
represent about one third of the world's commercial fleet. 
Also fire box explosions are considered which - as discussed above -
appear to be the predominant causes of failures in recent years. 
This is primarily a new category of problems, resulting from control 
and the use of highly explosive fuel rather than from design or 
materials. These fire box explosions are explicitly excluded from 
the BoardofTrade reports discussed in Chapter III. 
The failure rates are related to operation years of boilers rather 
than of ships, since the number of boilers at risk is available. 
Since also the construction rate is known, the failure ratio S(tc), 
can be calculated. 
As opposed to the British steam ships investigated above, one does 
not deal here with a strongly declining population (see Fig. 11). 
Whereas the main boilers are used exclusively aboard steam ships, 
auxiliary boilers are used also an motor ships that dominate in the 
recent decades. 
Because df the short Observation time interval, a completion of P1 
and M1 by explosions that are statistically tobe expected in the 
fut~re is required to find the construction year and age dependencies, 
P(t ) and M(T), of the safety performance. The completion provides 
in this case a substantial contribution, contrary to Section III. 
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Trends of Failure Rates 
The trends of boiler failure rates were analyzed in the same way 
as in the previous section by applying isotonic regression to the spacings 
between failure events, here measured in boiler-operation years. The re-
sulting monotonaus frequency trend is depicted in Figs. 12 and 13 tagether 
with the 90 % confidence intervals. The main-boiler analysis, Fig. 12, 
is based on 31 failures that occurred between 1968 and 1981 in ships con-
structed since 1960. The auxiliary boiler failures in Fig. 13 show the 
trend of the 97 failures recorded for the years 1960 through 1981 in ships 
constructed since 1960. The main boilers show no significant trend, this 
is not surprising because of the small time interval. The langer series 
for auxiliary boilers however shows a significant decrease in its failure 
rate. The values for main boilers are higher than for auxiliary boilers, 
probably because of the more difficult operation of the much larger fire 
boxes. 
Construction Year and Age Dependencies 
In the same way as in Section III were the failure data combined in 
intervals to yield approximations for the failure potential, P1(tc), on 
the one hand and the age dependency, M1(,), on the other. Since for the 
Lloyd's data, the (annual) construction rates are known, the approximate 
failure tatio, s1, can be determined, too. However, over the short obser-
vation periods, neither P1 nor M1 decrease very much. Therefore, the com-
pletion procedure developed in Ref. 4 needs to be applied to obtain a 
meaningful characterization of the safety performance.by the completed 
values S(tc) and K(•) - the latter of which is the normalized M(,). This 
requires the solution of an integral equation as described in Ref. 4. The 
result indicates that 14 explosions of main boilers should be statistically 
exp~cted in addition to the 21 that have occurred in the past, in units 
constructed since 1968 (see Fig. 14), whereas the auxiliary boiler analysis 
adds 26 failures to the actuarial number of 97 events in units construc-
ted since 1960 (see Fig. 15). The correspondin9 rise of S as compared to 
the actuarial-data based approximation, s1, is clearly apparent in Figs. 
14 and 15. 
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The relative completion naturally increases with tc, because an 
increasing fraction of· the useful life lies in the future. The rise of s1 
into S in auxiliary boilers (Fig. 15) amounts to about 70% at the end 
of the observation period as compared to only 5 % at the beginning. 
The time span for the main boiler data (Fig. 14) is so short that 
a partitioning of the tc period in several intervals did not appear to 
be useful. (The level of significance of the trend of S would be much less 
than 90 %.) Therefore, the data were analyzed in toto, yielding an addition 
of 35 failures to be statistically expected as compared to the 21 actuarial 
events. The increase in S as compared to s1 is assessed only on the average, 
amounting to about 70 %. 
8oth main and a~xiliary boilers show a 90% significant decrease 
of the normalized age distribution, K(T), within 14 resp. 22 years 
of age. 
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V. SUMMARY 
This paper begins in Section II with a description of the techno-
logical development of boilers aboard steam ships, emphasizing the evolu-
tionary improvement of their safety as well as economic performance. The 
latter appears in terms of thermodynamic efficiency and overall power 
output, the former in terms of a reduction in the frequency of boiler ex-
plosions. 
The discussion of the evolution of safer boilers aboard steam ships 
is complemented by a statistical analysis of a lang series of Observations 
(and descriptions) of explosions aboard British steam ships from 1882 
through 1974 in Section III, as recorded by the Board of Trade. The number 
of steam ships covered in this statistic increased at first, reached a 
maximum of more than 8000 before the First World War and decreased sub-
sequently to about 200 (though much larger) ships today. The major part 
of the analysis considers the steam generating system for the ship pro-
pulsion that includes the main boilers. 
The analysis is a search for a trend underlying the statistically 
fluctuating temporal spacings between the explosion events. The results 
are expressed in the form of a sequence of failure rates per ship-year 
of operation. Apparently, there is a strong and statistically highly 
significant declining trend of the failure rate, beginning with about one 
explosion per 250 ship-years to less than one per 2500 ship-years toward 
the end of the observation period (1974). 
In addition, trends of failure causes were analyzed: Design-error 
related explosions receded strongly already araund the turn of the century. 
The frequency of material and construction related causes shows two periods 
of strenger declines, one araund the turn of the century and one before 
the Second World War. Human error as a cause of failure shows no signi-
ficant decline over the entire period; i.e. the design did not become 
more forgiving. 
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The analysis of the age dependency of the failure occurrencesexhibits 
a strong decrease after about 10 to 15 years, following an earlier increase 
that is probably due to material- and age-related problems as well as 
inadequate maintenance. 
Furthermore, a larger and newer ship population, from Lloyd's Register, 
was investigated in Section IV where the failures also included gas explo-
sions in fire boxes (that are excluded in the BoardofTrade reports). 
Though the observation periods are much shorter (1960 through 1981 for 
auxiliary boilers, and 1968 through 1981 for main boilers), information on 
the number of boilers at risk as well as on construction rates was avail-
ab 1 e; th i s then a 11 owed- ·a more deta il ed ana lys i s. 
The trend analysis of the failure rates, here related to boiler 
rather than ship-operation years, shows no statistically significant de-
cline over this relatively short observation period for the main boilers. 
However, some decrease is noticeable between the beginninq and the end 
of the langer Observation period for auxiliary boilers. The explosion 
frequency generally is higher than it appeared for the last years of the 
British steam ship analysis in Section III, largely due to the inclusion 
of the relatively large numb~r of fire box explosions. 
The availability of construction rate data, in addition to the 
failure data, allowed a statistical evaluation of the failure ratio,, 
i.e. the probability of an explosion during the useful life of a boiler. 
This evaluation is possible by a combination with the analysis of the age 
distribution of failures and its use for a completion of the actuarial 
data by projecting events that have to be statistically expected in the 
future. This statistical completion procedure, developed in Ref. 4, yields 
14 main boiler failures in addition to the recorded 21 events, and 26 addi-
tional failures for auxiliary boilers, as compared to 97 actuarial (past) 
failures in the evaluated data base. 
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